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Genetic Testing in Children and
Adolescents: Parental Authority, the Rights
of Children, and Duties of Geneticists
MARY Z. PELIAS
SUSAN H. BLANTON t
I. Introduction
During the past decade technological capabilities in molecular genetics have
expanded exponentially.' Concomitant with technological growth developed
concern about using new molecular technologies to generate personal genetic
information about individuals and families who are coping with various genetic
disorders. Geneticists began to scrutinize the relationships that arise in the
context of genetic counseling, and, in particular, several geneticists and psy-
chologists suggested that no children should ever be tested for the gene that
causes Huntington disease,2 even when testing is requested by their parents.3
This suggestion raised several issues that have direct bearing on decisions about
genetic testing, including the nature of the disease and the availability of
treatment, the roles of parents and the rights of children within the family,
and the obligations of geneticists who participate in both testing and coun-
seling.
*Mary Z. Pelias, Ph.D., is a Professor of Genetics at Louisiana State University Medical
Center, New Orleans, Louisiana. Susan H. Blanton, Ph.D., is a Research Assistant
Professor of Pediatrics/Medical Genetics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.
1. Theodore Friedman, Molecular Genetics, in Bernard D. Davis, ed, The Genetic Rev-
olution: Scientific Prospects and Public Perceptions 132, 136 (Johns Hopkins 1991).
2. Huntington disease is a neurodegenerative disease that is caused by a dominant
gene located on chromosome 4. The age of onset is usually the third or fourth decade of
life, with progressive motor and mental debilitation and death within 15 years of onset.
No treatment or cure is yet available for this disease. Current molecular techniques permit
the detection of the gene, and prediction of inevitable disease, at any time after con-
ception. J. Thoene, ed, Physicians' Guide to Rare Diseases 310-311 (Dowden 2d ed 1992).
3. M. Bloch and M.R. Hayden, Opinion: Predictive Testing for Huntington Disease
in Childhood. Challenges and Implications, 46 Am J Hum Genetics 1, 2 (1990); Peter S.
Harper and Angus Clarke, Should We Test Children for "Adult" Genetic Diseases?, 335
Lancet 1205, 1206 (1990).
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One potential effect of the policy suggested for Huntington disease was a
realignment of the professional and personal relationships that arise when a
patient or family seeks genetic evaluation and help. Geneticists and genetic
counselors have traditionally acted from a perspective of providing information
and counseling that will help patients and families understand and cope with
their genetic problem on their own terms, within their own constellation of
circumstances.4 If geneticists institute policies about who should or should not
have access to genetic tests, decisions about testing will no longer rest with
patients or families, and geneticists will place themselves squarely in the middle
of families who are trying to deal with their own genetic legacies.
Geneticists are currently amassing a plethora of tests and information that
may be of critical interest to individuals and families who have a stake in
planning their own lives with a knowledge of their own genetic endowment.'
What is now incumbent on geneticists, genetic counselors, physicians, and
other medical professionals is careful evaluation of their roles and influences
in the lives of their patients. This consideration includes an examination of the
changing nature of the physician-patient relationship as more sophisticated
methods are developed for detecting and coping with the spectrum of genetic
diseases. Also included in the examination of the practice of contemporary
medical genetics is careful comparison of the relative positions of parents,
children, and medical professionals in the changing world of medical genetics
and genetic counseling.
II. The Physician-Patient Relationship
A physician-patient relationship is formed when a patient seeks medical
care and the physician agrees to provide such care. Technically, the relation-
ship is based on an implied contract, with duties and expectations attaching to
both parties at the time the relationship is joined.' The physician assumes a
duty of providing due care to the patient, and expects remuneration and
cooperation. The patient assumes a duty to assist in his medical management
and expects the physician to provide appropriate care. This reciprocity is
modified, however, by the fact that interactions between physicians and
patients take place in a fiduciary interaction-one that is typified on one side
by a person who has a duty, created by his position, to act primarily for the
benefit of another person.7 The imbalance in the fiduciary realtionship is based
on the physician's special training and expertise in medicine and the patient's,
or family's, relative lack of medical knowledge. Within the context of medical
genetics, the fiduciary relationship relies on a genetics professional who has
4. American Society of Human Genetics Ad Hoc Committee on Genetic Counseling,
Genetic Counseling, 27 Am J Hum Genetics 240, 240-41 (1975).
5. Committee on Assessing Genetic Risks, Institute of Medicine, Assessing Genetic
Risks: Implications for Health and Social Policy 29-30 (National Academy Press 1994).
6. Hankerson v Thomas, 148 A2d 583, 584 (DC 1959).
7. Steven H. Gifis, Law Dictionary 185 (Barron's 2d ed 1984).
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both a broad knowledge of genetics and an ability to convey relevant informa-
tion to people who seek it.
Beyond the continuing imbalance in the physician-patient relationship,
however; is a substantive metamorphosis that has taken place during this
century in the respective roles of the physician and patient in selecting an
appropriate course of treatment. Prior to the twentieth century, medical
knowledge was limited, with few if any options for patient care.8 However,
the advent of anesthesia and the explosion of medical knowledge over the last
100 years have dramatically increased options for patients, and the physician-
patient relationship has experienced a significant shift in the basis of decisional
authority. A sequence of consistent judicial decisions has reinforced the right
of the patient to make his own choices about which course of treatment to
pursue.9 The shift in decisional authority has redefined the fiduciary duty of
the professional, so that the duty of the physician has evolved from one of
making the best decision for the patient to one of informing the patient about
various options in order to permit the patient to make a fully informed
decision. This new balance in the physician-patient relationship continues to
acknowledge the physician's superior knowledge, but it also gives deference to
patient autonomy for deciding among options for medical treatment, or indeed,
for no treatment at all.
The case-law approach to the physician-patient relationship has broadened
the concept of medical malpractice to include the "Doctrine of Informed
Consent." From this doctrine is derived the principle that the patient, rather
than the medical professional, is the primary decision maker in matters of
medical care and treatment."0 To be sure, the physician may continue to
exercise some control with respect to how, and how much, information is
conveyed to the patient." But, nowadays, the ultimate power of decision rests
with the patient-the person who must live with these decisions for a lifetime.
In the context of medical genetics, patients and families who seek genetic
counseling may reasonably expect to be fully informed about available tests
and the implications of test results.
III. The Nature of the Disease
When researchers in Huntington disease suggested that no children be
tested for the presence of the gene, they offered the rationale that testing
children would be pointless because the disease has a late age of onset and no
8. Ruth R. Faden and Tom L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed
Consent 75-76 (Oxford 1986).
9. Mohr v Williams, 95 Minn 261, 269, 104 NW 12 (1905); Schloendorff v Society
of New York Hospitals, 211 NY 125, 105 NE 92, 93 (1914); Canterbury v Spence, 464
F2d 772, 780 (DC Cir 1972).
10. Faden and Beauchamp, Informed Consent at 140 (cited in note 8)..
11. Jay Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient 80 (Free Press 1984).
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presently available treatment.'2 This argument against testing children for the
Huntington gene does have some appeal: the child may gain nothing from
presymptomatic testing, and may even be harmed by knowledge of inevitable
debilitation. The argument continues with the assertion that the right to
generate such devastating genetic information should rest with the child, who
may later exercise that right after reaching adulthood, according to his own
wishes. This line of reasoning has also been advanced by some genetics
professionals who counsel about the dominant gene that causes familial breast
cancer.' 3 What this argument fails to acknowledge, however, are the interests
and obligations of parents, who are charged by society with providing for their
children, and who may well be able to justify their quest for learning their
children's genotypes even if the gene may not begin to work its damage until
years later. 4
A somewhat different set of concerns arises in families coping with other
types of genetic diseases, including one form of familial cancer, familial
adenomatous polyposis of the colon (FAP)."5 This disease appears in late
childhood or adolescence and is amenable to surgical treatment. Psychological
studies of children at risk for carrying the gene for FAP have revealed that
children are intuitively aware of the risks and are often relieved to learn their
genetic status, whether positive or negative.' Children may even develop a
unique, positive sense of "belonging" when they learn they are gene-positive, 7
or alternatively, they may experience a unique, negative sense of "survivor
guilt" if they are found to be gene-negative." Experience with FAP and other
diseases that have a childhood onset and an option for treatment reveals that
12. Bloch and Hayden, 46 Am J Hum Genetics at 2 (cited in note 3).
13. Frederick P. Li, et al, Recommendations on Predictive Testing for Germ Line p53
Mutations Among Cancer-Prone Individuals, 84 J Natl Cancer Inst 1156, 1159 (1992);
Barbara B. Biesecker, et al, Genetic Counseling for Families With Inherited Susceptibility
to Breast and Ovarian Cancer, 269 JAMA 1970, 1973 (1993).
14. See, infra, notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
15. Familial adenomatous polyposis of the colon is caused by a dominant gene on
chromosome 5. The appearance of benign polyps in the colon is a prelude to malignant
transformations and bowel cancer. Children who are known to carry the gene can be
monitored for the appearance of polyps and can avoid developing the cancer if the bowel
is surgically removed. See generally, Thoene, Physicians' Guide to Rare Diseases (cited in
note 2).
16. Sandi Wiggins, et al, The Psychological Consequences of Predictive Testing for
Huntington's Disease, 327 N Engl J Med 1401, 1404-05 (1992); Garber and Diller,
Screening Children at Genetic Risk of Cancer, 5 Curr Opin Pediatr 712 (1994); see also
Gloria M. Peterson and Patricia A. Boyd, Gene Tests and Counseling for Colorectal
Cancer Risk: Lessons from Familial Polyposis, 17 Monograph J Natl Cancer Inst 67, 69
(in press).
17. Peterson and Boyd, 17 Monograph J Natl Cancer Inst at 69 (cited in note 16).
18. The sense of "belonging" relates to the child's closer identification with the affected
parent and with siblings who are gene-positive. "Survivor guilt" may develop when a child
who is gene-negative realizes that he or she may out-live siblings who are gene-positive.
Dorothy C. Wertz, Joanna H. Fanos, and Philip R. Reilly, Genetic Testing for Children
and Adolescents: Who Decides?, 272 JAMA 875, 876 (1994).
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reactions of individuals and families to information about individual status
vary significantly among families, a finding that' underscores the unique
personal circumstances of each family and the variety of scenarios that are
encountered in the counseling arena.
Additional levels of genetic concern have been recognized with identifica-
tion of a genetic "predisposition" to develop a disease. A number of health
problems are determined by the interaction between an individual's genotype
and the environmental milieu. For example, a genetic predisposition to develop
dangerously high blood cholesterol levels can be tempered by adopting a low-
fat diet that may permit the individual to avoid the ravages of cardiovascular
disease." Similarly, children who have the gene for familial hypertrophic
cardiomyopathy can be treated with medications that may prevent cardiac ar-
rhythmias and significantly reduce the risk of sudden death.2" When such
clear benefits are so easily realized, professionals appear to be less concerned
about possible negative effects of determining and revealing the genotypes of
children.
Finally, carrier status for many recessive diseases is becoming increasingly
feasible as the genes that cause these diseases are mapped and cloned. Some
geneticists argue that testing for carrier status should not be available for
children because determination of carrier status generally has no immediate
medical implications for children and may even have a detrimental effect on
relationships within the family.2 Such determinations could, however, have
significance for adolescents, because of their increasing awareness of biological
processes and their own emerging sexuality, even though the likelihood of their
having affected children still remains small. Perhaps the most rational course
to pursue for carrier detection in children is one of attention to the views of
the children and their parents: children who have siblings with recessive
diseases, for example, may have an extraordinary interest in early resolution of
any uncertainty about their own genetic status and their chances of having
children with the same problems, so that carrier testing at the request of the
children and their parents may provide considerable benefit to several members
of a family.'
With respect to biological and medical effects, genetic diseases vary in their
modes of inheritance, age of onset, and severity of expression. With respect to
social factors, genetic diseases vary greatly in the burden to both the patient
and the family-a burden that includes appropriate medical care, financial sup-
19. Jean A. Cortner, et al, Familial Combined Hyperlipidemia in Children: Clinical
Expression, Metabolic Defects, and Management, 123 J Pediatr 177, 178, 181 (1993).
20. Barry J. Maron, et al, Hypertrophic Cardiomyopatby: Interrelations of Clinical
Manifestations, Patbopbysiology, and Therapy, 316 N Engl J Med 844, 849 (1987).
21. J.H. Fanos and J.P. Johnson, C.F. Carrier Status: The Importance of Not Knowing,
55 Am J Hum Genetics Suppl A292 (1994) (abstract of poster session).
22. ASHG/ACMG Report, Points to Consider: Etbical, Legal, and Psycbosocial Implica-




port and insurance issues, 23 and the personal and interpersonal effects of the
disease on individual family members, both affected and unaffected.24 Given
such a patchwork of medical and social issues, the rational approach to deci-
sions about testing children seems to lie both in appreciation of the disease
process and in the unique, expressed interests of the members of each family.
Such an individual approach, devoid of blanket professional judgments about
making tests available or not, would honor the tradition of genetic counseling
as well as the autonomy and individuality of each family: the issue is not the
nature of the disease itself, but rather, the situation and expectations of the
family that is coping with the difficult burden of genetic disease.2'
IV. Parental Authority
The family as the basic social unit of human beings has been remarkably
stable over much of history. While some social arrangements do represent
deviations from the "norm," the family unit has traditionally been headed by
the father, who has occupied the position of provider and protector for his
family. The mother, often with a nursing infant, was less mobile, and tra-
ditionally managed the home and looked after the children. Children custom-
arily obeyed their parents and contributed their labor to the welfare of the
family group.26 Throughout much of history, the dominant role of the man
as head-of-household extended to his power of life and death over his spouse
and children, and his power to sell them as property. The wife had few rights,
and the children virtually none.27
The recognition of both women and children as individual persons-the
acknowledgment of their personhood in society-has progressed gradually.
With the development of social conscience and awareness, both women and
children have become persons in the eyes of society and the law, although
persons with circumscribed rights. In the balance of roles among persons in the
family, society has consistently supported, first, fathers, and now parents, as
the persons who make decisions for their own families. On some occasions
when states have assumed a decision-making posture with respect to the care
and rearing of children, the judiciary has firmly but clearly reinforced the
authority of parents to decide for their own children and families.
Support for parental authority has been supplied by the Supreme Court
when challenges to state legislation have run afoul of constitutional guarantees.
23. Paul R. Billings, et al, Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic Testing, SO Am
J Hum Genetics 476, 479 (1992).
24. Wertz, Fanos, and Reilly, 272 JAMA at 878 (cited in note 18).
25. American Society of Human Genetics, 27 Am J Hum Genetics at 240 (cited in
note 4).
26. Vivian A Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Chil-
dren 58 (Basic Books 1985).
27. Mary Martin McLaughlin, Survivors and Surrogates: Children and Parents From
the Ninth to the Thirteenth Centuries, in Lloyd deMause, ed, The History of Childhood
140 (Harper & Row 1974).
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Three early cases raised questions about the authority of parents to make
decisions about the education of their children. One decision held that a state
that forced teachers to teach only English to grade school children deprived
those teachers of a liberty interest guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
The Court defined the "liberty" interest to include "the right of the individual
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children" 8 Two
years later the Court invalidated an Oregon law that required all children
between the ages of 8 and 16 to attend public school. In speaking for parents
who preferred to send their children to private and parochial schools, the
Court found a "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control.... The child is not the mere crea-
ture of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations."2 In a third case based on decisions about educating children the
Court supported the practice of Amish parents who removed their children
from state schools at the end of eighth grade so that the children could finish
their training within the Amish community. The Court found that this practice
did not cause serious damage to the state's interest in compulsory education,
and that forcing Amish children to continue in state schools might constitute
a violation of religious freedom guaranteed by the first amendment. 0 These
early cases serve as a constitutional foundation for parental authority within
the family-a foundation that is strong enough to withstand the weight of
state legislation that attempts to undermine the parental prerogative.
While Supreme Court decisions about education may seem peripheral to
issues of genetic testing and the interests of geneticists, the Court has more
recently considered the power of parents in making medical decisions for their
own children. On several occasions in the early 1980's, the parents of infants
born with severe impairments elected to forego treatment for one problem
when the infant's overall diminished quality of life would remain unchanged.
As these cases became familiar to the public, the United States Department of
Health and Human Services ("DHHS") promulgated a regulation that permit-
ted discontinuation of federal funds to any hospital that deprived an infant of
treatment on the basis of its handicap. The Supreme Court found that DHHS
had overstepped its legislative mandate and clearly stated that the difficult
decisions about impaired newborns rest with the parents and physicians of
these sadly compromised infants. The Court stated that "[s]tate law vests
decisional responsibility in the parents, in the first instance."' Thus, from the
early cases about controlling a child's education to this recent case about
treating handicapped newborns, the Supreme Court has consistently supported
28. Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 399 (1923).
29. Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 535 (1925).
30. Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205 (1972).
31. Bowen v American Hosp Ass'n, 476 US 610, 627 (1986).
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parents as the persons charged with the awesome, sometimes terrible, duty to
provide for and to make decisions for their own minor children.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also set limits on what parents
may demand from the medical profession. In a case that addressed issues
surrounding the commitment of children to state mental hospitals, the Court
surveyed the hospital admission procedures and noted that each child received
separate psychological and psychiatric evaluations before admission, assuring
that parents could not use the hospitals as convenient places to house their
obstreperous children. The Court noted:
[I]n the voluntary commitment setting . . . the parents . . . retain a
substantial, if not dominant, role in the decision, absent a finding of
neglect or abuse, and . . . the traditional presumption that the parents
act in the best interests of their child should apply . . . . [H]owever . . .
the child's rights and the nature of the commitment decision are such
that the parents cannot always have absolute and unreviewable discretion
to decide whether to have a child institutionalized. They . . . retain
plenary authority to seek such care for their children, subject to a
physician's independent medical judgment.32
This case has some appeal to geneticists who refuse to provide genetic testing
for children at the request of their parents on the grounds that testing will not
provide a clear medical benefit for the child. However, the geneticist who
adopts this position must account for the distinction between the commitment
of a child to a mental hospital and a genetic test on a child at the request of
his parents. Surely the physician's judgment is critical in the former decision,
and in many other medical situations as well, but it is considerably more
tenuous in the situation of genetic testing, if only because the parents may
have well-founded reasons for knowing the genotypes of their own children:
parents have interests in providing financial, medical, and environmental
benefits for their children, as well as interests in planning their own lives and
futures.
Parents in our society are expected to raise their children with care. Their
task is one of heavy responsibility, often offset by personal satisfaction. Both
society and the law give parents wide latitude in their roles as caretakers and
decision-makers for their children. Both society and the law operate from the
presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children. Reasonable
persons may disagree with the opinions and decisions of some parents, but
society continues to support the parental prerogative within the privacy of the
family.
32. Parham v J.R., 442 US 584, 604 (1979) (emphasis added).
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V. Rights of Children
Over much of human history children have enjoyed few if any personal
rights.33 This century, howeve; has witnessed a surge of concern for young
people and an expanding interest in their growth and maturation from infancy
to adulthood. Children are no longer viewed as a source of labor. To the
contrary, our recognition of children as small individuals has emerged side by
side with recognition of the rights that vest in children as members of our
social order. While children do not enjoy all the rights that society confers on
adults, they do enjoy considerable moral and legal protection as persons
deserving of respect and care.34 While professionals in genetic counseling are
usually acutely aware of the dynamics in families that seek help with their
genetic problems, the interests of children are continually the focus of special
consideration?'
The most fundamental right that society confers on children is the right to
adequate care, including shelter, food, clothing, and health.36 To be sure,
many children in our society do not receive adequate care-a home, a good
diet, shoes and coats, or immunizations and antibiotics, but what they do
receive is usually provided as a result of parental initiative or parental request,
either in the private sector or in public assistance programs. 37
The idea that children are entitled to adequate care is incorporated into
statutes governing child abuse and child neglect. 38 Child abuse usually refers
to physical abuse, while neglect refers to failure to provide the elements of
adequate care. The statutes specify both criminal and civil penalties for parents
who do not provide acceptable care for their children. Criminal prosecutions
may include charges of assault and battery, or rape, or in extreme cases,
manslaughter or murder, and penalties may include fines, imprisonment, or
more. Civil penalties may include removing the child from the custody of the
parent and placing the child in a more favorable, fostering environment.
Conversely, an additional though unsuccessful source of legal redress has
occasionally been sought by children who have been subjected to abuse or
neglect: some victims have occasionally tried to sue their own parents for their
injuries, but the courts have consistently refused to allow the children to
33. McLaughlin, Survivors and Surrogates at 140 (cited in note 27).
34. Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child at 7 (cited in note 26).
35. See ASHG/ACMG Report, 57 Am J Hum Genetics at 1234 (cited in note 22).
36. Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards
for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster
Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 Stan L Rev 623, 629 (1976).
37. Parenthetically, the pivotal role of parents in providing adequate care for their
children is emphasized by the government program of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children. This program provides for children by giving money to the parent, with the
expectation that the parent will use the money for the benefit of the children. See 42 USC
5601 (1988 & Supp 1992).
38. Angela Roddey Holder, Legal Issues in Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine, 101
(Yale 2d ed 1985).
1996]
534 Roundtable
pursue actions against their parents. In commenting about the parent-child
relationship, the Oregon Supreme Court has noted that "[t]here are certain
kinds of relationships which are not proper fodder for tort litigation and we
believe this to be one of them."3 ' The courts have steadfastly refused to allow
children to sue their own parents in tort actions for any perceived injury.4"
Additional although indirect legal protection for children is found in state
statutes that require professionals to report instances of parental abuse, or
suspected parental abuse. Failure to do so can result in criminal prosecutions
and/or malpractice charges against physicians and other professionals.41 On
the other hand, physicians who do report these problems in good faith are
immune from prosecution for malpractice or defamation if they are mistaken
in their suspicions. Children receive further legal protection in legislation that
requires social agencies to act on behalf of children who are reported to be
victims of abuse or neglect.42
In addition to protection from abuse and neglect, children have found
additional protection from society in the development of health and immuniza-
tion programs, public education and recreation programs, and "parenting"
programs. On the practical side, these programs are immensely helpful in terms
of personal and public health, in teaching children useful information and so-
cial and vocational skills, and in teaching new parents skills and methods for
fulfilling their roles as parents. On the theoretical side, these programs are a
clear acknowledgement of the personhood of children, deserving of nurture and
respect.
However, even with the social progress in acknowledging the personhood
and individuality of children and in reinforcing their rights, children still enjoy
fewer rights than adults. One limitation of children is the fact that they are
not autonomous persons. Personal autonomy in the legal sense vests only when
a person reaches the statutory age of majority or is otherwise recognized as an
adult in the eyes of the law.43 An example of minors who are legally re-
garded as adults are persons who have been emancipated, although even
emancipated adolescents may continue to be restricted in their capacity to
contract, for example, or in their capacity to sell or encumber property. So
even emancipation may come with restricted autonomy, with full legal autono-
my vesting only at the age of majority.
Within a typical family, the parents are the individuals who are autono-
mous, while the children are not. A family who seeks genetic evaluation will
be under the care of the parents, who may exercise their autonomy in caring
39. Burnette v Wahl, 284 Or 705, 588 P2d 1105, 1111 (1978).
40. Zepeda v Zepeda, 41 111 App 2d 240, 190 NE2d 849 (1963), cert denied, 379 US
945 (1964); Lloyd v Howard, 566 S2d 424 (La 3d Cir 1990).
41. Note, Civil Liability for Teachers' Negligent Failure to Report Suspected Child
Abuse, 28 Wayne L Rev 183, 184 (1981).
42. Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection, Criminal and Civil
Liability in Child Welfare Work: The Growing Trend 5-12 (ABA 1983).
43. Holder, Legal Issues in Pediatrics at 130 (cited in note 38).
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for and providing for their own children. To suggest that we owe a duty to
children to protect their autonomy, or future autonomy, is to say that the not-
yet-existent interests of children supersede the real and present interests of
parents who are obligated to care for their families and who must plan their
own lives. Parents have interests in exercising their own autonomy now, while
their children have only a future prospect of becoming autonomous persons
with the same rights as their parents. Finally, the exercise of parental autono-
my should not be presumed to be only in the selfish interests of the parents:
some parents may indeed be selfish, but parents are still the persons who must
make decisions on behalf of their families.
The evolving rights of children have also expanded to judicial consider-
ation for the welfare of children in a special standard of making decisions that
are in the "best interests of the child." While there is usually little doubt about
where these interests lie, occasionally the task of defining the best interests of
children is complex and difficult. In the case of Baby M in the 1980's, for
example, involving a contract for surrogacy, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
found the best interests of the child to lie in shared custody between the
couple who sought to become legal and social parents and the surrogate
mother who had agreed to surrender the child at birth.' This decision sus-
pended the child between two vastly different sets of parents, households, and
systerihs of values, and it raised lingering questions about definitions of the best
interests of the child. In less complex circumstances, like parents' requesting
genetic testing for their family, the parents may indeed have questionable
motives, but because they may also have admirably altruistic motives, the law
presumes them to be acting in the best interests of the entire family.
The recognition of children as persons and individuals has also been
affirmed by numerous acknowledgments that children should have a role in
medical decisions. The courts in many states have been increasingly sympathet-
ic to adolescents who independently seek treatment for sexually transmitted
diseases and for pregnancy, and a body of rulings has been recognized as the
"mature minor rules" that permit treatment of minors, in some circumstances,
in the absence of parental permission. The extent of their participation should
depend on their level of understanding and their general maturity, and the
treatment must be reasonably simple.4" The caveat that the geneticist should
heed is that the issue of a child's consent, or an adolescent's consent, must be
weighed against the wishes of the parents and the gravity of the medical, or
genetic, issue at hand.
44. In re Baby M., 225 NJ Super 267, 542 A2d 52 (1988), reversing, in part, 217 NJ
Super 313, 525 A2d 1128 (1987) (the court awarded custody to the legal parents, and
visitation rights to the surrogate mother).
45. Holder, Legal Issues in Pediatrics at 134 (cited in note 38).
19961
536 Roundtable
VI. Duties of Geneticists
In the most elementary sense, a geneticist's duty toward the people who
seek counseling derives from the physician-patient relationship that is formed
when a patient or family seeks help. In the absence of a defined relationship,
the geneticist owes no duty at all. But once the patient, or family, asks for
help, and the geneticist agrees to contribute his or her expertise, the relation-
ship is joined."' The geneticist is then bound to help the patient, or family,
understand their genetic situation and to adjust to it the best way they can.
One major concern in deliberations about genetic testing in children is
identifying the patient, or patients, in the clinical and counseling setting. For
the geneticist who trained in pediatrics, the initial answer may be that the
patient is the child and that the duty is owed to the child. For the internist,
on the other hand, the initial answer may be that the parents are the patients
and that the duty is owed to them. An early definition of genetic counseling
stresses that one goal of genetic counseling is to help patients to "choose the
course of action which seems appropriate to them in view of their risk and
their family goals and [to] act in accordance with that decision."" Thus
genetic counseling should help the family make the best possible adjustment to
its genetic situation in view of its values and circumstances, and the counseling
scenario often becomes more complex than the one-on-one interaction in many
other physician-patient interactions. To deal with these more complex inter-
actions, some observers suggest that "[t]raditional views about doctor-patient
relationships may have to change. In genetics, the patient is really the family
rather than the individual."48 The geneticist may thus have a duty to several
persons, including both the parents and their children.
A second major concern in genetic testing in children is defining the extent
of the duty of the genetics professional. If the goal of genetic counseling is to
provide comprehensive help for the family, the geneticist must carefully
examine the process of genetic counseling and the content of information that
is conveyed. Geneticists who developed the protocol for counseling in
presymptomatic testing for Huntington disease have constructed an exhaustive
process, including several counseling sessions, both before and after genetic
testing.49 This process serves to inform patients and to assess their under-
standing and reactions, and there is much to learn from the Huntington
prototype. To provide counseling before testing is an excellent means of
informing patients, or parents, about the many implications of the information
they seek, including the fact that genetic information can have both positive
46. See, supra, notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
47. American Society of Human Genetics, Genetic Counseling at 240 (cited in note 4).
48. Dorothy C. Wertz and John C. Fletcher, Ethics and Genetics: An International Sur-
vey, 19 Hastings Ctr Rprt Supp 20, 24 (1989).
49. Marguerite A. Chapman, Canadian Experience with Predictive Testing for Hunting-
ton Disease: Lessons for Genetic Testing Centers and Policy Makers, 42 Am J Med Ge-
netics 491, 493 (1992).
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and negative ramifications. Parents who seek to have their families tested can
be helped to understand that genetic information about their children
may--but not necessarily must-have a negative impact on each child individu-
ally and on family relationships in general. Parents should understand that
some children want to know and indeed need to know about their own
situation, and that some children feel a great sense of relief when they have
hard information, one way or the other.50 Parents should also understand that
some children do not want to know or need to know, and that some children
may never want to know, even after they start making their own decisions.
Finally, geneticists should respect the difficult decisions of parents, who may
or may not reveal test results to their children, depending on what the parents
think is best for their children and their family. The geneticist is obliged to
present this information in a thorough manner and in understandable language,
and to explore all options with the family. For the geneticist to fulfill his duty
in the fiduciary relationship with the patient or family, both the process and
the content of genetic counseling must be thoughtful and thorough. However,
after the parents, and perhaps the children, are informed, what they decide in
terms of pursuing testing or sharing information should be their own deci-
sions."
Aside from considering the process and content of genetic counseling and
genetic testing, geneticists should also be aware of the possible legal conse-
quences associated with the birth of children who have predictable inherited
disorders. After the decision of the United States Supreme Court extending the
right to privacy to include a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy, 2 and
with the expansion of technologies in prenatal diagnosis,53 the options for en-
suring the birth of healthy children increased dramatically. Parents have
become increasingly aware of the possibility of having children with genetic
disorders or other problems that can be predicted before conception or during
pregnancy, and they have become increasingly insistent on their right to bear
healthy children, within the limits of contemporary technology. Litigation in
medical malpractice for wrongful birth has increasingly supported the claims
of parents who assert injury resulting from the birth of children with predict-
able diseases or defects, and claims for wrongful life, brought by children born
with predictable problems, have also been honored in a few cases. 4 The
50. Indeed, one geneticist who has generally opposed genetic testing in children has
observed that "children in families with Huntington disease often recognize much earlier
[than the ages of 14 and 16 years] that something is wrong and thus might benefit from
earlier information." Michael Hayden, Book Review, 48 Am J Hum Genetics 171, 172
(1991) (reviewing Susan E. Folstein, Huntington's Disease: A Disorders of Families (Johns
Hopkins 1989)).
51. Mary Z. Pelias, Duty to Disclose in Medical Genetics: A Legal Perspective, 39 Am
J Med Genetics 347, 351 (1991). See also Neil F. Sharpe, Psychological Aspects of
Genetic Counseling: A Legal Perspective, 50 Am J Med Genetics 234 (1994).
52. Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).
53. Sherman Elias and George J. Annas, Reproductive Genetics and the Law 83 (Year
Book Medical 1987).
54. Mary Z. Pelias and Margery W. Shaw, Medicolegal Aspects of Prenatal Diagnosis,
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geneticist who counsels cautiously and thoroughly may well avoid the incon-
venience associated with allegations of wrongful birth and wrongful life as well
as the damage associated with adverse judgments of medical negligence.
The duties of geneticists have thus become more rigorous as technological
capacities in medical genetics have expanded. The scope of genetic counseling
has come to include concern for all members of families that are coping with
difficult genetic problems, and the geneticist has become increasingly aware of
the psychosocial implications of genetic information. While few geneticists have
formal training in psychology or sociology, they have developed an increasing
sensitivity to the effects of genetic information in the lives of patients and
families who seek information and help."5 Most geneticists have practiced and
still practice from a view of non-directive counseling that subordinates personal
value judgments of the professional to the judgments that patients make in
view of their own circumstances.
VII. Conclusions
Potential applications of new knowledge and technologies in medical
genetics have fostered a new examination of how professional geneticists
should now practice genetic counseling and how the geneticist should interact
with persons and families who seek help with their genetic problems. Newly
developed powers to elucidate individual genotypes underscore the need for re-
specting the prerogative of parents to seek genetic information about their
families, but only with caution and concern for the welfare of children whose
lives may be significantly altered by knowledge of their most personal infor-
mation. Striking a balance between parental concerns and interests, on the one
hand, and the welfare of children, on the other, has expanded the role of the
geneticist as counselor to individuals and to families. As geneticists continue to
explore the implications of new knowledge and technologies, they will best
serve patients and families when they avoid adopting across-the-board rules
and policies and continue to treat each counseling situation as the unique set
of personal circumstances that it is. In the difficult world of genetic testing in
children, the geneticist will continue to convey difficult information to individ-
uals and to families within their ability to comprehend, and will help these
persons make the best possible adjustment to their situation. The geneticist
who continues to be forthright and thorough will continue to help both
parents and children as they adjust to their own, personal genetic situations.
in Aubrey Milunsky, ed, Genetic Disorders and the Fetus: Diagnosis, Prevention, and
Treatment 799, 804 (Johns Hopkins 3d ed 1992).
55. American Society of Human Genetics, 27 Am J Hum Genetics at 240 (cited in
note 4).
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APPENDIX: CASE SCENARIOS
1. HUNTINGTON DISEASE
The Disease: Huntington disease (HD) is an autosomal dominant
neurodegenerative disorder characterized by premature neuronal cell death. Initial
symptoms include clumsiness and forgetfulness. Personality changes are common
and may be associated with depression or symptomatic schizophrenia. The
average age of onset is 38 years, although symptoms may appear at any time
between the first and seventh decade of life. The disease may have an earlier
onset when the gene is inherited from the father than when the gene is inherited
from the mothen Symptoms and debilitation progress to death, usually within 20
years of onset. Presymptomatic testing is available for determining individual
genetic status. Because of concern for suicide and other adverse psychosocial
reactions, individuals who seek presymptomatic testing are required to par-
ticipate in several counseling sessions, both before and after testing, in order to
assess the patient's mental and emotional status and to evaluate the patient's
support system. There is no treatment for this disease."
The Family: The Wilson family has a 20-year relationship with the genetic
counseling clinic because of multiple family members affected with HD. Several
individuals in the family, mostly minors, want more information about testing.
Of the 15 family members who attend a counseling meeting, some are symptom-
atic, some are at risk, and the remainder are caregivers. Several of the seven
adolescents readily indicate that they would commit suicide if they have the gene.
Jimmy and Timmy, 14-year-old identical twins, appear to have early motor
symptoms of the disease, and Jimmy has been referred for neurological evalua-
tion because of behavior problems in school, including fighting and poor impulse
control. Patrice, the 15-year-old sister of the twins, offers several sound reasons
for her request for testing; she does not express suicidal intentions, appears
otherwise mature in her reasoning, and shows no signs of having the disease.
Lotty, an 18-year-old second cousin, with a tatoo on her left arm, a pierced nose,
and partially shaved head, has a history of poorly controlled diabetes and has
just learned that she is pregnant; she wants to be tested for the HD gene. She has
wrecked 3 cars while showing off to friends and is in an abusive relationship
with a 32-year-old male crack addict. She wants to end the relationship but is
afraid for her life, although she admits that she has considered suicide during the
past 3 months.
The Counseling Issues: Although this family has a clear general understand-
ing of the consequences of having the gene for HD, each person who seeks
testing, or whose parents request testing, should be evaluated individually. De-
termining the genotype of Jimmy will determine the genotype of his twin and
may help to explain their symptoms and confirm a suspected diagnosis. While
such information could aid in dealing with Jimmy's behavior problems, it could
56. See, supra, notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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also push both twins toward suicide. Although Patrice is younger than the age of
18 recommended for testing, she appears capable of dealing with the outcome of
testing and will probably be tested if her counseling sessions confirm her stabili-
ty. While Lotty is of adult age, she is emotionally troubled and should be
encouraged to resolve her immediate problems before pursuing testing for the
HD gene.
2. TAY-SACHS DISEASE
The Disease: Tay-Sachs disease (TSD) is a progressive neurodegenerative
disorder that is inherited in an autosomal recessive manner. For an individual to
be affected, he or she must receive a copy of the abnormal gene from each
parent. Individuals who have only one copy of the abnormal recessive gene are
carriers and are unaffected by the disease. If both parents are carriers, they have
a 25% chance at each pregnancy of having an affected child, a 50% chance of
having a carrier child, and a 25% chance of having a child who has no gene for
TSD. Children born with two copies of the abnormal gene develop normally for
about 6 months and then begin to show developmental regression, including loss
of motor milestones and progressive paralysis, dementia, and blindness. Death
usually occurs in the second or third year of life. The gene that causes TSD is
found most commonly in persons of Ashkenazi Jewish descent; carrier frequency
in this population is estimated at I in every 30 persons. Carrier testing and
prenatal diagnosis are available and are considered reliable. There is no treatment
for this disease. 7
The Family: Paula Hecht is a 53-year-old Ashkenazi Jewish woman who has
requested carrier testing for her 13-year-old daughter, Sharon. Mrs. Hecht's
family history reveals that her first child, born during her first marriage, died of
TDS in 1960. Her second husband, Mr. Hecht, is not a carrier of the gene for
TSD, and they have two sons and a daughter, Sharon. It becomes clear that Mrs.
Hecht had a very difficult time dealing with the death of her first child and the
ensuing dissolution of her first marriage, caused in part when her in-laws blamed
her for the death of their first grandchild. Her in-laws correctly insisted that the
child would have been healthy if Mrs. Hecht had not been a carrier, and they
also asserted that nothing like this had ever happened in their family. Mrs. Hecht
clearly feels ashamed of being a carrier and wants to spare her daughter the
heartache of losing a child to TSD. Mrs. Hecht suggests that if Sharon is a
carrier, she should avoid dating young men who have lost relatives to TSD.
Sharon is clearly aggravated with her mother and is not interested in carrier
testing or counseling. She appears to be an intelligent though rather immature
individual.
The Counseling Issues: Testing a minor is only one issue in this scenario.
Mrs. Hecht should first recognize that she hopes to alleviate her own guilt by
having her daughter tested, that no "fault" attaches to her for the death of her
57. Thoene, Rare Diseases at 242 (cited in note 2).
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first child, and that both parents contributed equally to the first child's genotype.
Resolving Mrs. Hecht's turmoil might be approached with information that every
person carries several deleterious recessive genes, and that most persons discover
their carrier status only after the birth of a child with a genetic disease. Sharon's
avoidance of dating boys who have lost relatives to TSD will not eliminate the
possibility of dating carriers because most carriers have no affected relatives.
Further, Sharon's subsequent choices about having children may render any
question of carrier status moot. Alternatively, she could later elect carrier testing
or prenatal diagnosis, as she matures and makes her own choices.
3. SICKLE CELL ANEMIA
The Disease: Sickle cell anemia (SCA) is an autosomal recessive disorder of
the beta chain of hemoglobin, the oxygen-carrying protein in red blood cells.
When blood oxygen level is dramatically decreased, as it is during strenuous
physical exercise, hemoglobin molecules polymerize and distort the smooth,
circular shape of red blood cells to pointed "sickle" shapes. The irregular shape
then causes clogging of small blood vessels with oxygen deprivation and pain in
surrounding tissues. Sickled red cells are eventually destroyed by the spleen,
which becomes enlarged because it is overworked, and decreased red cell count
results in anemia. The most common causes of hospitalization in children with
SCA are bacterial infections and vaso-occlusive crises, and infection is the most
common cause of death. Penicillin prophylaxis is the recommended treatment for
avoiding infections. Age of onset varies, even within families, and older affected
siblings may not be diagnosed until the disease is diagnosed in younger brothers
or sisters. There is presently no cure for SCA, although treatment with hy-
droxyurea appears to decrease the frequency of crises."s
The Family: Maryland is one of 2 states that require parental consent for
newborn screening. Mr. and Mrs. Walker live in Baltimore and have just had a
baby son, Justin, whom they refuse to have tested for SCA. Their older son,
Stephen, was diagnosed with SCA two years ago at the age of 5, and his disease
has been mild. The Walkers offer the following reasons for refusing to have
Justin tested: (1) Stephen's late diagnosis and mild disease indicates that Justin,
if affected, will also have a mild course; (2) Stephen's affected status reduces the
chance that Justin will be affected; (3) the heelstick to obtain a blood sample
could cause Justin extra discomfort.
The Counseling Issues: The family's understanding of the genetics and
medical basis of SCA needs clarification, and they should be urged to consent to
testing. Extreme variability in expression of the disease implies that Justin could
well have a severe course of the disease. Affected children benefit from very early
penicillin prophylaxis even though they may not have problems during the first
6 months of life. Stephen's affected status in no way modifies the 25% chance
that Justin is affected (or the 75% chance that he is unaffected): chance has no
58. See, generally, Thoene, Rare Diseases (cited in note 2).
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memory, and each conception is a "new roll of the dice." Hospitalization for
bacterial infections and vaso-occlusive crises, which may be life-threatening, is far
more uncomfortable than a heelstick for a sample of blood. Knowledge of
Justin's medical status will have a significant effect on the course of his medical
care and his ultimate well-being.
4. FAMILIAL ADENOMATOUS POLYPOSIS
The Disease: Familial adenomatous polyposis of the colon (FAP) is an
autosomal dominant disease. Individuals who have one copy of this gene are
affected with the disease, and each child of an affected person has a 50% chance
of inheriting the disease gene from the affected parent. FAP is characterized by
the appearance of adenomatous polyps in the large intestine and the transforma-
tion of polyps to malignant growths. The age of onset of malignant transfor-
mation varies, even within families, from childhood through the seventh decade,
with an mean age of diagnosis at 40 years. Annual colonoscopy screening
permits early detection and sugical removal of intestinal polyps and tumors, al-
though tumors may develop at sites other than the colon. Testing family mem-
bers can determine who carries the gene long before polyps appear."'
The Family: John Henry is a 12-year-old boy hospitalized for pneumonia.
The medical student assigned to assess John has just finished a rotation in
medical genetics and is conscientious about taking a thorough family history
from John's father, Mr. Henry. John's parents are divorced, and John's mother,
now Mrs. Duggan, age 30, has sole custody of her son and is not present in the
hospital. Mr. Henry relates that his ex-wife's father, brother, paternal grand-
mother, and paternal uncle all died of colon cancer, though a specific diagnosis
is unknown. When Mr. Henry later asks Mrs. Duggan about the disease, she
refuses to discuss it. The attending physician requests a genetics consult, and the
geneticist arrives while Mr. Henry and Mrs. Duggan are arguing. Mrs. Duggan
does admit that many persons in her family have FAP, although she has no
symptoms and is not screened regularly. Mrs. Duggan also relates that her sister
lost her health insurance when she was found to have polyps-an event that
Mrs. Duggan wants to avoid for herself and her son. And Mrs. Duggan states
that she has not discussed FAP with her son because she does not want to cause
him worry, although she has nightmares about the possibility that she and her
son are affected. Mrs. Duggan also emphasizes her own continuing good health
as a sign that her son could not have any problems until much later in life.
Finally, Mrs. Duggan relates that a cousin died of bladder cancer, unrelated to
FAP.
The Counseling Issues: Mrs. Duggan needs counseling to help her understand
clearly the genetics and medical nature of FAP: her own risk of developing FAP
is presently 50%, and her son's is 25%. If she has the gene for FAP, her son's
risk is increased to 50%. The extremely variable age of onset of this disease
59. See, supra, notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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means that both she and her son might presently have polyps or malignant
tumors. Her cousin's bladder cancer may have been related to the gene for FAP,
and both she and her son may have other tumors as well. Mrs. Duggan's belief
that she is sparing her son unnecessary worry is probably an illusion. John may
well elect to be screened if given a choice, and Mr. Henry should be a part of
any deliberations and decisions about testing. Mrs. Duggan's concerns about
insurance discrimination are valid and bode for postponing genetic testing,
although both she and John should be screened for polyps on a regular basis.

